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The organization of a close corporation involves detailed planning
on the part of an attorney. This article emphasizes the importance of
considering a control allocation plan when a corporation is being
formed. The author discusses the possibility of using a voting agreement as a part of such a control allocation plan. Particular attention
is given to the problems and perils of using a voting agreement.

CLOSE CORPORATION CONTROL
AND THE VOTING AGREEMENT
Harvey Gelb*
CLOSE CORPORATION CONTROL AND
THE VOTING AGREEMENT

The organization of a close corporation' is frequently
no simple undertaking to be accomplished by squeezing an
hour or two of work into a lawyer's busy day. Both tax and
nontax factors may require the use of substantial legal
expertise and time at the inception of the incorporation
process. In selecting the corporation as the form in which
to operate their business, clients typically are motivated
by tax or limited liability advantages, and not by a desire
to embrace the traditional corporate governmental structure,
Copyright@ 1981 by the University of Wyoming

*Professor of Law, University of Wyoming; J.D., 1960, Harvard, Cum Laude;
Editor, Harvard Law Review. Admitted to the bar: Pennsylvania, 1961.
1. There is no single definition of the term close corporation. As used herein,
the term refers to a corporate entity with relatively few shareholders
whose shares are generally not traded on the securities markets. Often,
too, the shareholders have significant involvement in the management of a
close corporation. For further discussion see O'NEAL, 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS Ch. 1 (2d ed. 1971).
[Hereinafter cited as O'NEAL].
2. In the traditional corporate governmental structure embodied in statutes,
shareholders elect directors, directors are responsible for management and
elect officers, and officers execute corporate policy. Shareholders do retain control over certain fundamental corporate matters such as charter
amendments and dissolution.
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of which they are often largely ignorant and toward which,
if they were knowing, they would likely be hostile. The
attorney's job of explaining to clients the operation of the
corporate structure and the matters to be considered before
deciding to incorporate may be formidable but may not be
ignored. This article does not cover all of the issues which
may arise in organizing a close corporation, but rather has
the following more limited purposes: (a) to emphasize the
importance of considering a control allocation plan when the
corporation is being formed, and (b).to discuss the possibility
of using a voting agreement as a device in such a plan, with
particular attention to the problems and perils of such use
even in a jurisdiction with a statute expressly sanctioning
voting agreements.
THE NEED FOR A CONTROL PLANA HYPOTHETICAL CASE

Consideration of a rather simple hypothetical case
demonstrates the need for careful planning regarding the
allocation of control in the prospective close corporation.
A and B have been the only partners in the X partnership which has been in business for the past several years.
A has contributed twenty-five percent of the capital and B
seventy-five percent, and by agreement the profits and losses
of the business have been shared by the partners in percentages reflecting their capital contributions. Both partners
worked the same number of hours- but neither received a
salary. The profits of the past year in the amount of $120,000
were divided so that A received $30,000 and B received
$90,000. Their accountant recommended that the business
be incorporated for tax reasons. A and B who are largely
without knowledge concerning the traditional corporate
governmental structure advised their attorney that they
wished to incorporate and that their only motive was tax
salving. Their attorney, without discussing with them differences in the control structures of partnerships and corporations, promptly filed articles of incorporation of X Inc.,
* 3. Tax -considerations, though very important -to the corporate planner, are
beyond the scope of this article.
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obtained a corporate kit containing the usual by laws,
minutes and stock certificates, filled in the blanks, had
twenty-five percent of the shares of common voting stock
(the only class of stock authorized by the articles of incorporation) issued to A and seventy-five percent issued to
B so as to reflect their capital contributions to the new corporation, and took no action whatsoever to alter what would
be the traditional corporate governmental structure for X Inc.
Although it may have seemed to the parties that they
received excellent and speedy service down the road to incorporation, the former partners with the aid of their legal
counsel have stumbled into a new relationship foreign to
their expectations. This new relationship may be illustrated
by looking at three important ways in which A's rights have
deteriorated.
Management:. Subject to any agreement between them,
"all partners have equal rights in the management and
conduct of the partnership business,"4 and "any difference
arising as to ordinary matters connected with the partnership business may be decided by a majority of the partners."'
In the hypothetical case, no special agreement is posited
regarding the management of the X partnership; therefore
A could block management action which B desires to take.
In the traditional corporate governmental structure, however, the Board of Directors is responsible for management
of the business, and B's seventy-five percent ownership of
stock enables him to control the Board. Much to A's surprise,
and perhaps even to B's surprise, A's legal position vis-a-vis
B has deteriorated enormously.
Distribution of funds: As indicated above in the X
partnership, the partners received no salaries6 but by agreement A received twenty-five percent of the profits and B,
seventy-five percent.
4.

UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(e). This Act has been adopted widely in
the United States.
5. Id. at § 18(h).
6. Absent agreement, under the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18(f), "no

partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the partnership business,
except that a-surviving partner is entitled to reasonable compensation for
his services in winding up the partnership affairs."

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1981

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 16 [1981], Iss. 1, Art. 8

228

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVI

Corporate funds may be disbursed to the shareholders
in a variety of ways; e.g. salaries and fringe benefits to
shareholder employees, interest to shareholder lenders, rent
to shareholder lessors, and dividends (based on share ownership). If X Inc. is operated like many small corporations,
dividends (which are not deductible for tax purposes) may
be minimal or nonexistent and disbursements are likely to
consist of deductible items so that maximum tax advantages
are achieved. In such a situation, A's twenty-five percent
ownership interest would be unrelated to the sums he is to
receive from the corporation except in those rare instances
where dividends are paid. In any event, the power of B as
the controlling shareholder operating through the traditional
corporate framework will largely determine what A gets,
if anything, whether by way of salaries, dividends or otherwise.
Dissolution: While A as a partner has the important
right to compel dissolution of the partnership,7 A's right as
a dissatisfied minority stockholder to compel the dissolution
of X Inc. may be subject to significant statutory and judicial
limitations.8
It is obvious that by exchanging a twenty-five percent
partnership interest for a twenty-five percent shareholder's
interest, A, without being cognizant of differences between
the corporate and partnership entities, has exchanged his
position of strength for one of weakness without ever having
had a fair chance to bargain to preserve his status. Indeed
in the hypothetical case under consideration, it is doubtful
that A would have been compelled to bargain at all. If the
issues of control were raised, A should have found no resistance on B's part to an allocation plan which would have
maintained A's rights satisfactorily since the purpose of
this incorporation was to save taxes, not to alter A's position
relative to B.
7. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(1) (b) and (2).
8.

Statutory limitations are evident from a cursory review of 2 MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. § 97 (2d ed. 1971). Judicial reluctance regarding dissolution is evident in In re Radom and Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d

563 (1954).
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It should be evident too that with a loss in power, A
will find a loss in value respecting his ownership interest.
B, who would be the most likely buyer should A decide to
sell,9 would find it much more valuable to buy out a partner
who could compel dissolution of a successful business or who
has substantial rights respecting profits and management
than to buy out a mere minority shareholder."°
THE VOTING AGREEMENT AND THE CONTROL PLAN

Now let it be assumed that prospective incorporators
and their legal counsel are aware of the ways in which the
traditional corporate governmental structure differs from
that of the partnership and that they become engaged,
therefore, prior to incorporation, in serious discussions concerning a corporate control allocation plan. Their discussion
may embrace a variety of matters such as management roles,
compensation, and other corporate policy decisions, and stock
ownership restrictions. After consultation with their counsel
they may wish to deal with the issues that concern them in
a variety of ways. For example they may want to provide
that certain issues should be decided in advance, that there
should be a veto power possessed by each with regard to
certain other matters, and that other questions should be left
to the normal processes of traditional corporate government.
It would then become the job of legal counsel, after reviewing
the range of available mechanisms, to devise a suitable plan.
Some of the tools which may be considered for use in such
a plan are voting agreements, cumulative voting, classification of shares, higher than majority quorum and voting
requirements for shareholders and directors, employment
agreements, buy-sell agreements (with stock transfer restrictions) and preemptive rights. Consideration may also be
given inter alia to devices for breaking deadlocks, resolving
disputes, and even easing the path to corporate dissolution
9. It likely will be difficult to find any other buyer anxious to succeed to A's
minority position.
10. It should be noted that the controlling shareholder does not have absolute
power to abuse the corporation or the minority shareholder. It is beyond
the scope of this article to consider potential claims available to a disgruntled minority shareholder. Hopefully, good advance corporate planning
will eliminate any need for litigation and promote an amicable environment
in which corporate affairs may be conducted properly.
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under certain circumstances. The mechanisms to be used
may call for the skillful drafting of a variety of documents
such as contracts, articles of incorporation and by-laws.
As previously indicated, this article focuses primarily
on one of the devices which counsel may consider using in
the control allocation plan-the voting agreement. From a
purely mechanical point of view, the voting agreement may
be used in the control allocation plan in a limited way, or to
deal with a whole range of problems or merely to reinforce
other arrangements. For example, a voting agreement may
merely secure for A representation on the board of directors
which together with other devices, such as charter provisions
requiring unanimity for certain directors' actions, in effect
would give A veto power with respect to such actions.
It should be noted that the shareholder voting agreement, as the term is used herein in a strict technical sense,
should relate only to matters falling within the ambit of
shareholder action (such as the election of directors). However, since counsel may wish to consider broadening the
agreement in an effort to cover other matters such as, the
election of officers, employment arrangements, and dividends,
the discussion herein also will touch upon some of the issues
raised by a voting agreement which has been so broadened.
While well aware of the need for a control allocation
plan, the lawyer involved in the organization of the close
corporation may perceive of the voting agreement, perhaps
with undue optimism, as an ideal form in which to embody,
in whole or in part, a plan which exchanges the traditional
corporate governmental structure for one which more satisfactorily meets the needs and expectations of the parties.
Since difficult questions may arise concerning the validity
and enforceability of voting agreements, over-reliance on
voting agreements may prove unwise, particularly in certain
jurisdictions. Therefore, the lawyer contemplating their use
must study carefully pertinent statutes and cases. Before
considering statutees dealing expressly with voting agreements, counsel should review the various principles elaborated
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss1/8
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in cases involving such agreements. As will be seen, knowledge of such principles will prove useful in interpreting and
determining the efficacy of such statutory provisions and in
assessing the legal situation in jurisdictions where no statute
expressly covers voting agreements. In order to demonstrate
the kind of analysis in which counsel should engage and the
kinds of problems which are likely to be encountered, some
case law principles are discussed hereafter and certain
statutory provisions expressly pertaining to voting agreements are then analyzed in light of such principles. For
convenience, the principles to be considered are discussed
under the following headings: (1) per se invalidity (2)
purpose or effect (3) consideration (4) statutory norms
(5) enforcement.
Per Se Invalidity: While the weight of authority supports the proposition that under the general common law
rule a voting agreement is not, per se, invalid,11 principles
may emerge from case law in certain jurisdictions which
would result in the per se invalidation of a voting agreement.
For example, the principle that shareholders must be free
at all times to vote for what they deem the best interests
of the corporation"2 would invalidate an agreement precluding such voting freedom. Obviously, the lawyer considering
the use of a voting agreement must assess whether any
principle mandating the invalidation of such an agreement
has vitality in the prospective corporate jurisdiction.
Purpose or Effect: Even in jurisdictions in which
voting agreements are not invalid per se the question of
their validity in light of their purpose or effect may arise.
In one case, 3 corporate indebtedness was cancelled and cash
advanced to a corporation, in exchange for forty percent of
the corporation's shares and equal representation on the
Board of Directors. A shareholders agreement entered into
by the owners of most of the stock of the corporation required that a four member Board of Directors be maintained,
and that each of two shareholders should have the right to
11. Weil v. Beresth, 154 Conn. 12, 220 A.2d 456 (1966).
12. Roberts v. Whitson, 188 S.W. 2d 875, 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
13. E. K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954).
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designate two Board members. In the face of a contention
that public policy forbids the enforcement of a contract by
which a shareholder undertakes to bargain away his right
to vote for directors according to his best judgment, and in
the interest of the corporation, the court ruled that shareholders control agreements are not invalid per se but emphasized the importance of the purpose and effects of the
agreement:
But we think the correct rule is that stockholders
control agreements are valid where it is for the
benefit of the corporation, where it works no fraud
upon creditors or other stockholders, and where it
violates no statute or recognized public policy. "The
propriety of the object validates the means, and
must affirmatively appear.""

In another case, the court referred to the importance of
damage suffered or threatened in determining the validity
of the agreement:
It would admittedly facilitate judicial supervision
of corporate behavior if a strict adherence to the
provisions of the Business Corporation Act were
required in all cases without regard to the practical
exigencies peculiar to the close corporation. ...
However, courts have long ago quite realistically,
we feel, relaxed their attitudes concerning statutory
compliance when dealing with close corporate behavior, permitting "slight deviations" from corporate "norms" in order to give legal efficacy to
common business practice. .

.

. This attitude is

illustrated by the following language in Clark v.
Dodge: "Public policy, the intention of the Legislature, detriment to the corporation, are phrases
which in this connection [the court was discussing
a shareholder-director agreement whereby the directors pledged themselves to vote for certain
people as officers of the corporation] mean little.
Possible harm to bona fide purchasers of stock or
to creditors or to stockholding minorities have more
substance; but such harms are absent in many
instances. If the enforcement of a particular con14. Id. at 299.
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tract damages nobody-not even, in any perceptible
degree, the public-one sees no reason for holding
it illegal, even though it impinges slightly upon the
broad provisions of [the relevant statute providing
that the business of a corporation shall be managed
by its board of directors]. Damage suffered or
threatened is a logical and practical test, and has
come to be the one generally adopted by the courts."' 5
In Grogan v. Grogan6 which involved voting trust
agreements, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals focused on
the importance of discovering the purpose of the agreements
in determining their validity:
Since the agreements themselves did not indicate
the purpose for which they were executed, it was
proper for the trial court to hear evidence to show
the real purpose for the execution of such agreements.'
The Court concluded that the evidence was satisfactory to
show that the purpose of the agreements was to continue
a person in a lucrative corporate position, that such person
was not only a party to the agreements, but also had them
drawn, and secured the signatures of most of the remaining
shareholders who signed them, and that because of such
facts, the agreements were void. The Texas Supreme Court,
while finding fault with the way in which the lower court
stated the law, found that reversal was not required. "
While the meaning of the holding in Grogan may not be
clear, if Grogan suggests that the securing of a lucrative
position by a party to a voting agreement is a prohibited
objective rendering such agreement invalid in a given jurisdiction, then the utility of such agreements in such a jurisdiction would be impaired seriously. However, since the placement of a capable and conscientious person in a lucrative
position may be of great benefit to the corporation and other
interested parties, and since interests requiring protection
can be safeguarded by an appropriate inquiry regarding
15. Galler v. Galler, 32 Il1.2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577, 584-585 (1964).
16. Grogan v. Grogan, 315 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), writ of error
denied 159 Tex. 392, 322 S.W.2d 514 (1959).
17. Id. 315 S.W.2d, at 39.
18. Grogan v. Grogan, 159 Tex. 392, 322 S.W. 2d 514 (1959).
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the agreement, a rule invalidating the agreement, merely
because it has as an objective the securing of a lucrative
benefit for a party, is unnecessary and unwise.
In any event, the lawyer contemplating the use of a
voting agreement must consider the "purpose or effects"
issue, and in drafting an agreement, should give thought
19
to the feasibility of inserting a clause indicating its purpose.
Consideration:The question of consideration for a voting
agreement may present difficulties which a lawyer would
not normally anticipate. In contrast with the normal contract rule, it has been held that mutual promises are in0
sufficient consideration for voting agreements." It may be
that because voting agreements in the eyes of some judges
may resemble proxies to the extent that they confer authority
to vote shares, courts have applied proxy revocability concepts from agency law to them. However, the contrary conclusion that mutual promises are sufficient consideration
for such agreements has also been reached.2 ' Although the
use of agency concepts to determine the validity or binding
nature of voting agreements designed to deal with control
allocation problems seems artificial and inappropriate, counsel must be concerned about the pitfalls of the consideration
issue in using a voting agreement in a particular jurisdiction and should consider, when possible, supporting the
agreement by consideration other than the parties' mutual
promises to vote their shares.22
A further complication in connection with voting agreements arises from the kind of benefit received by a shareholder in exchange for his vote. In one case, the court, citing
the principle that "any agreement by a shareholder to sell
his vote or to vote in a certain way, for a consideration
personal to himself is contrary to public policy and void,""
invalidated consents of shareholders to vote their shares in
19. Various drafting suggestions including this one are set forth in O'NEAL,
supra note 1, § 5.27.
20. Roberts v. Whitson, supra note 12.
21. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch.
610, 53 A.2d 441 (1947).
22. O'NEAL, supra note 1, § 5.27.

23. Chew v. Inverness Management Corp., 352 A.2d 426 (Del. Ch. 1976).
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the election of directors procured through payment to them
of ten cents per share for options to buy the shares at prices
in excess of their rather dubious value. Although, the foregoing principle is not so widely applied as to invalidate all
voting agreements which result in gain or advantage to
parties,2 4 counsel must be concerned with the kind of benefit
being conferred on the shareholder as a result of a voting
agreement, and as to whether it falls within the prohibited
zone of personal benefit in the applicable jurisdiction.
Statutory Norms: Challenges to the validity of voting
agreements are sometimes based upon alleged conflicts with
statutory provisions. 5 In a broad sense any voting agreement
not expressly sanctioned by statute, which seemingly undermines the traditional statutory corporate governmental
structure, is arguably subject to attack on that basis. The
proposition that the law evidences a policy that individuals
cannot be partners inter sese and a corporation as to the
rest of the world has been accepted26 and rejected27 by courts
as has the notion that statutory provisions for actions by
majority vote preclude establishment of unanimous voting
requirements." Where agreements purporting to cover matters outside the ambit of shareholders action-such as
matters placed by statute within the discretion of the Board
of Directors-have been attacked, the results of the cases
have been mixed. In one case,29 an agreement executed by
all shareholders providing for one of them to select a manager with authority to supervise and direct operations and
management without approval of the Board of Directors was
held invalid as in violation of a statutory provision that the
business of a corporation shall be managed by its board of
directors; while in another case, 0 an agreement providing
for declaration of dividends, and continuation of a deceased
24. O'NEAL, supra note 1, § 5.15.
25. Alleged conflicts with statutory provisions expressly sanctioning voting
agreements are discussed later.
26. Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J.Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (Ct. Err. & App. 1910).
27. Arditi v. Dubitzky, 354 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1965).
28. Compare Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829
(1945), with Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28, 97 A.2d 180 (1953).
29. Long Park Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77
N.E.2d 633 (1948).

30. Galler v. Galler, supra note 15.
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executive's salary to his widow was sustained. In still
another case3 involving an agreement, which the court held
could reasonably be found by a jury to protect three contracting brothers who were major or sole stockholders of
corporations incorporated in several states from removal
from office, the potential for mixed results was illustrated
vividly by a court holding that the agreement was valid
except as applied to a West Virginia corporation, but leaving
open the door for validating evidence on remand.
While a variety of arguments, such as those referred
to above, may be used to contest the validity of voting
agreements on the basis of alleged conflicts with statutory
provisions, strong arguments may be advanced in favor of
allowing close corporation shareholders flexibility in making
arrangements to fit their needs and expectations. Some
arguments of the latter type have been set forth succinctly
as follows:
While the shareholder of a public-issue corporation
may readily sell his shares on the open market
should management fail to use, in his opinion, sound
business judgment, his counterpart of the close
corporation often has a large total of his entire
capital invested in the business and has no ready
market for his shares should he desire to sell. He
feels, understandably, that he is more than a mere
investor and that his voice should be heard concerning all corporate activity. Without a shareholder
agreement, specifically enforceable by the courts,
insuring him a modicum of control, a large minority
shareholder might find himself at the mercy of an
oppressive or unknowledgeable majority. Moreover,
as in the case at bar, the shareholders of a close
corporation are often also the directors and officers
thereof. With substantial shareholding interests
abiding in each member of the board of directors,
it is often quite impossible to secure, as in the large
public-issue corporation, independent board judgment free from personal motivations concerning
corporate policy. 2
31. Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831
(1967).
32. Galler v. Galler, supra note 15, at 583-584.
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There is no reason why mature men should
not be able to adapt the statutory form to the
structure they want, so long as they do not endanger
other stockholders, creditors, or the public, or violate a clearly mandatory provision of the corporation laws. In a typical close corporation the stockholders' agreement is usually the result of careful
deliberation among all initial investors. In the large
public-issue corporation, on the other hand, the
"agreement" represented by the corporate charter
is not consciously agreed to by the investors; they
have no voice in its formulation, and very few ever
read the certificate of incorporation. Preservation
for
of the corporate norms may there be necessary
3
the protection of the public investors.
In some cases where voting agreements have been
attacked as in conflict with statutory provisions courts have
4
concluded that there really was no conflict, that the stat3
utory provisions involved were directory, that the deviation
6
from the statutory provisions was slight, or that the agreement was a valid waiver by the parties of the statutory
provisions.3
In any event, counsel in considering the utility of a
voting agreement in a particular jurisdiction must assess
the force of potential attacks on its validity based upon
alleged conflict with statutory provisions.
Enforcement: In drafting a voting agreement counsel
must be aware of the various factors involved in devising
a procedure to assure the effective enforcement of the agreement such as the following: (1) There is some conflict in
authorities as to whether specific enforcement of such an
33. Id. at 585.
34. Id. In Galler, the court concluded that a statutory ten-year limit on voting
trusts was not applicable to the control agreement involved in the case
which was not a voting trust.
35. Clark v. Foster, 98 Wash. 241, 167 P. 908 (1917).
36. In Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641, 642 (1936) a voting agreement was upheld with the court saying "If the enforcement of a particular
contract damages nobody-not even, in any perceptible degree, the publicone sees no reason for holding it illegal, even though it impinges slightly
upon the broad provision of section 27," (§ 27 was a statutory provision
that "the business of a corporation shall be managed by its board of
directors").
37. Peck v. Horst, 175 Kan. 479, 264 P.2d 888 (1953), decision adhered to on
rehearing, 176 Kan. 581, 272 P.2d 1061 (1954).
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agreement will be granted,3 (2) Some courts may imply
the existence of a proxy to vote shares in the absence of an
express proxy provision but others may not,"9 (3) Where
feasible an enforcement device which functions without
court intervention with its delays and other disadvantages
should be used,40 (4) In considering the use of a proxy as a
device for casting votes serious risks must be examined:
(a) an ordinary proxy whereby A gives B the authority to
vote A's shares is characterized as a terminable agency
relationship; (b) while proxies coupled with an interest
may be irrevocable, the cases are not clear as to what constitutes the requisite interest." Thus counsel may find that
in certain jurisdictions the proxy is an unreliable mechanism
for the enforcement of a voting agreement. (5) A dilemma
may exist in some jurisdictions by virtue of providing for
certain effective enforcement mechanisms in a voting agreement: if such mechanisms make the arrangement similar
to a voting trust, there is a risk that a court will hold the
arrangement illegal if it does not conform to statutory requirements pertaining to voting trusts.2
STATUTES EXPRESSLY DEALING WITH
VOTING AGREEMENTS

Analysis of statutory provisions expressly dealing with
voting agreements in the prospective corporate jurisdiction
is essential in determining the utility of such agreements
in control allocation plans. Consider, for example, Section 34
of the Model Business Corporation Act 3 which has been
enacted in a number of jurisdictions in identical or similar
form" which provides:
38. Compare Haldeman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 197 S.W. 376 (1917) with
Weil v. Beresth, supra note 11.
39. In Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, supra
note 21, the court refused to imply the existence of the proxy, although the
court below in that case had done so.
40. Such a device should be self-executing like a voting trust or proxy or other
mechanism providing for expeditious enforcement without litigation.
41. CARY AND EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 393-394 (5th
Ed. Unabr. 1980).
42. See Abercrombie v. Davies, 36 Del. Ch. 371, 130 A.2d 338 (1957).
43. 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 34 (2d ed. 1971). While this section has
been selected for analysis here, it should be noted that pertinent statutes
may vary considerably from the Model Act in the prospective corporate
jurisdiction.
44.

See OR. REv. STAT.
NEB. REV. STAT. §

§ 57.175 (1979),
21-2034 (1943).

KY.

REV. STAT.
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Any number of shareholders of a corporation
may create a voting trust for the purpose of conferring upon a trustee or trustees the right to vote
or otherwise represent their shares, for a period of
not to exceed ten years, by entering into a written
voting trust agreement specifying the terms and
conditions of the voting trust, by depositing a
counterpart of the agreement with the corporation
at its registered office, and by transferring their
shares to such trustee or trustees for the purposes
of the agreement. Such trustee or trustees shall
keep a record of the holders of voting trust certificates evidencing a beneficial interest in the voting
trust, giving the names and addresses of all such
holders and the number and class of the shares in
respect of which the voting trust certificates held
by each are issued, and shall deposit a copy of such
record with the corporation at its registered office.
The counterpart of the voting trust agreement and
the copy of such record so deposited with the corporation shall be subject to the same right of examination by a shareholder of the corporation, in
person or by agent or attorney, as are the books
and records of the corporation, and such counterpart
and such copy of such record shall be subject to
examination by any holder of record of voting trust
certificates, either in person or by agent or attorney, at any reasonable time for any proper purpose.
Agreements among shareholders regarding the
voting of their shares shall be valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms. Such agreements shall not be subject to the provisions of this
section regarding voting trusts.
Does such broad statutory authority for voting agreements
eliminate the problems and perils involved in using such
agreements?
First, the mere existence of Section 34 should overcome
any effort to declare a voting agreement invalid per se.
Second, both paragraphs of Section 34 relate to a trust or
agreement regarding the voting of shares, and do not deal
expressly with the question of whether a voting agreement
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may control nonshareholder matters such as actions within
the discretion of directors. Since Section 34 evidences a
legislative purpose to create a favorable climate for voting
agreements, it may be argued that an intent should be
implied to bring within its protective scope provisions of
voting agreements which cover nonshareholder matters. 5
However, it may be contended, perhaps with more force, that
the plain language of the statute with its obvious omission
of any attempt to cover nonshareholder matters cannot
support any construction of Section 34 which would validate
agreements concerning such matters. Indeed, arguably Section 34 may have a preemptive effect in that it may be
construed to preclude agreements other than those specifically authorized by its language.4"
Third, notwithstanding the broad language of the statute sanctioning voting agreements, inquiry by the court as
to the purpose or effect of the agreement should not be
foreclosed.47 For example, inquiry as to whether an agreement works a fraud on someone should not be precluded.
Fourth, it is difficult to see how the language of
Section 34 resolves the twin issues regarding consideration
discussed above. It would seem that a court would be concerned about the private benefit issue to the same extent
with or without Section 34. Arguably the statutory provision may reinforce the position that no special consideration is needed for voting agreements and that mutual
promises, therefore, are sufficient consideration for such
agreements, but the provision is not explicit on this point.
45. This argument is reinforced by Special Comment-Close Corporations, 1

Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 35 2, 756 at 757, 758 (2d ed. 1971) which
indicates that shareholder's agreements could relate to the election of
officers and other nonshareholder matters.
46. The preemption argument may threaten the validity of any voting agreement which does not comply strictly with statutes expressly authorizing
such agreements. In Wyoming, where a paragraph similar to (but containing
interesting variations from) the second paragraph of Section 34, supra
note 43, was repealed in 1979, the validity and enforceability of voting agreements other than voting trusts which comply with WYO.STAT. § 17-1-131 (a)
(1977) are open to question. Quaere whether a Wyoming court would hold
that the aforementioned repeal precludes such voting agreements or returns
the whole matter of the validity and enforceability of such agreements to
the realm of judicial law.
.47. Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 136 S.E.2d 569 (1964); Grogan v. Gro.... gan, "supra
MODEL

note 16.
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Fifth, while Section 34 limits the duration of a voting
trust to 10 years, an agreement covered by the second paragraph of the Section is affected by no comparable limitation,
and the second sentence of that paragraph should preclude
any implication of a 10-year limit with respect to agreements other than voting trusts. However, it is unlikely that
the aforementioned second sentence would foreclose an inquiry into whether a document which is not labelled a voting
trust is in reality such a trust because that would exalt
form over substance beyond reasonable bounds.
Sixth, Section 34 does not indicate that voting agreements must be entered into by all of the shareholders. Indeed
voting trusts created by "any number of shareholders of a
corporation" are expressly sanctioned. While the second
paragraph is not so clearly worded in that it sanctions
"agreements among shareholders regarding the voting of
their shares," judicial implication of the word "all" preceding the word "shareholders" would seem unwarranted.4 8
Seventh, insofar as voting agreements other than voting
trusts are concerned, enforcement problems remain serious
under Section 34. Since that Section indicates that such
agreements should be enforceable in accordance with their
terms, a controversy may develop over the kind of remedy
to be granted if the agreement does not contain terms
relating to enforcement. For example, while it may be contended that the statutory language evidences an intent that
the terms of an agreement should be enforced specifically
even though the agreement does not call expressly for such
enforcement, it also may be argued, that the statute is
neutral or even negative on the question of such enforcement if the agreement does not provide expressly for it. It
would be wise, therefore, for the draftsman to deal expressly
in the agreement with the problem of enforcement. Moreover, express provision for an enforcement mechanism will
be essential if a goal of enforcement without judicial intervention is to be attained.
48. Even though unanimity of shareholders as parties may not be a statutory
requirements for the validation of a voting agreement such unanimity should
enhance prospects for judicial acceptance of an agreement particularly
because of its impact on an argument based on prejudice to a shareholder.
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Eighth, since the proxy form may be used as an enforcement device in a voting agreement, statutory provisions
concerning proxies must be examined by the draftsman.
Paragraph three of Section 33 of the Model Business Corporation Act sheds little light on the value of the proxy as
a planning tool since it merely states that "a shareholder
may vote either in person or by proxy executed in writing
by the shareholder or by his duly authorized attorney-in-fact"
and that "no proxy shall be valid after eleven months from
the date of its execution, unless otherwise provided in the
proxy."49 This section does not really address itself to the
pitfalls in using proxies in voting agreements referred to
above. However, it may necessitate an express reference to
the duration of any proxy intended to survive after 11
months."
CONCLUSION

It is apparent that an attorney who is working on a
corporate control allocation plan should study carefully
issues involving validity and enforceability before utilizing
a voting agreement, and should acquire a comprehensive
understanding of other devices which may be used in conjunction with, or in lieu of, a voting agreement.
It would be well, too, for interested members of the
bar to ease their own tasks of providing for stable relationships in the close corporation setting by recommending
legislation, where needed, which would inject more certainty
into the process of developing appropriate voting agreements.
This does not mean that all documents labelled voting agreements should be legitimized without regard to any other
factors. But there is a need for the law to resolve with as
much clarity as possible issues of validity, and to provide
for reasonable and reliable enforcement methods.
49. 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 33, Par. 3 (2d ed. 1971).
50. Stein v. Capital Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 273 N.C. 77, 159 S.E.2d 351

(1968).
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